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Abstract. This paper presents a privacy-friendly and portable mobile
authentication solution. It addresses several shortcomings of conventional
methods such as passwords and smartcard solutions. It also meets the
needs of an increasingly mobile user. Trust in the client computer is
minimal and the authentication is entirely delegated to the smartphone,
which makes it portable across diverse workstations. Our approach in-
volves authentication using securely stored credentials on the smart-
phone. The client workstation does not need to be modified, whereas
only minor changes to the Web server are required.
Key words: mobility, user-centric identity management, privacy, secu-
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an ever increasing growth of personalised Web
services. Moreover, users are no longer bound to one workstation for their online
activities. With these two trends, the need emerges for a portable and privacy-
friendly credential solution. Two frequently used credential types are passwords
and PKI solutions embedded in smartcards, both of which have a number of
drawbacks. Passwords form a rather weak authentication means and do not
allow the service provider to obtain reliable information about the user. Smart-
card solutions, on the other hand, require the presence of extra hardware, more
specifically card readers. Furthermore, installation of middleware can pose an
impeding administrative overhead or is simply not possible due to insufficient
permissions on the workstation. The middleware must also typically be trusted,
something users are not always able or willing to do.
Contribution. This paper proposes a strategy for mobile authentication to a re-
mote Web server in order to get access to resources. It involves authentication
using securely stored credentials on a mobile device. Our solution does not re-
quire installing additional software on the client workstation, while only minimal
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modifications are needed on the server side. The prototype consists of a pluggable
module in a servlet container. Our approach also has several advantages over ex-
isting solutions. First, authentication is carried out by the mobile device, which
substantially increases credential portability across workstations. Moreover, our
solution is highly secure because it provides strong authentication and creden-
tials are stored on a tamperproof secure element. Mobile device compatibility
is also ensured by only using its camera for the transfer of the authentication
request from the workstation to the smartphone. The user’s privacy is preserved
as a result of the controlled release of personal attributes (or properties thereof).
Finally, the solution is flexible enough to integrate other credential technologies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lists the requirements of the
prototype application. Section 3 presents the attack models we will be covering
in the evaluation. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the design and implementation re-
spectively. Section 6 evaluates our prototype. Finally, a number of conclusions
are drawn.
2 Requirements
2.1 Functional requirements
F1 Users want to securely gain access to personalised Web-based services from
an arbitrary workstation, in a privacy-preserving manner.
F2 Service providers want to obtain reliable user information.
2.2 Usability requirements
U1 Our solution can be applied to a broad range of mobile devices.
U2 No extra software must be installed on the workstation.
2.3 Security and privacy requirements
The architecture from [7] is used because it meets several security and privacy
requirements. It allows for selective disclosure of attributes and their properties:
they are only released if allowed by the access policy. Besides that credentials
never leave the trusted module on which they are stored, attributes and their
properties are only transferred to the service provider over a secure, authentic
channel. Furthermore, the user must authenticate using a PIN, before the trusted
module is activated. The architecture also provides the service provider with
reliable user information and allows for identification of users by a trusted third
party in case of abuse.
Other imposed security requirements are:
S1 It must not be possible to deceive the user about which service provider he
is connecting to.
S2 The user should be able to authenticate to a service provider.
S3 In case of loss or theft of the smartphone, no unauthorised parties may be
able to gain access to the user’s credentials or authenticate on his behalf.
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3 Attack models
Multiple attack models are applied in the evaluation (section 6.1):
M1 The attacker acquires physical control of the mobile device.
M2 The attacker has full control of the workstation, including the browser.
M3 The attacker has control of the workstation, but not of the browser.
M4 The attacker can eavesdrop on network traffic and/or modify messages.
We assume at all times that the attacker does not remotely control the authenti-
cation software running on the mobile device. This can be enforced using trusted
code execution technologies.
4 Design
The approach mainly targets authentication and assertion of personal informa-
tion about users using a smartphone. The solution uses trusted module func-
tionality that is readily available in smartphones (i.e. a secure element) or with
which smartphones can be extended (i.e. a SIM card or a secure micro SD card).
The solution consists of a software component on the smartphone and one on
the trusted module.
The trusted module component contains the authentication credentials and
logic. Embedding the credentials in trusted modules has several advantages.
Since smartphones are vulnerable to theft, the trusted module ensures that the
credentials cannot be abused. Further, some identity management systems (e.g.
[7], [1]) rely on the secure computing environment of trusted modules.
The smartphone component allows the user to activate the trusted module
to authenticate and gain access to personalized services. Moreover, it enables
communication with service providers and can forward communication between
the trusted module and the service provider.
Authenticating HTTP(S) sessions using the smartphone. As the authentication
device (i.e. the smartphone) is different from the device on which the service is
accessed (i.e. the workstation), a strategy is foreseen that allows Web services
to bind the authentication to existing HTTPS sessions. This strategy is further
described in this section.
Many communication technologies are supported by the current generation
of smartphones. However, most communication technologies require additional
software to be installed to allow interaction with the smartphone. Optical com-
munication, however, can easily be used to transfer data from the browser –
running on the workstation – to the mobile. The procedure discussed below ex-
ploits the screen of the workstation and the camera on the smartphone to transfer
information and bind the authentication of the smartphone to the HTTPS session
in the browser. The steps are enumerated below:
1. The browser initiates an HTTPS session with the Web service.
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2. The Web service sends a Web page containing a two-dimensional bar code
(or QR-code) representation of the session identifier and the address of the
authentication service to the browser.
3. The smartphone captures the QR-code shown in the browser using the em-
bedded camera.
4. The smartphone displays feedback about the service provider the user is
about to connect to.
5. The user gives his consent, after which the mobile device can initiate a
connection to the authentication module of the Web service using the xG
connection of the smartphone.
6. The trusted element in the smartphone and the Web service execute a mutual
authentication protocol after which the requested attributes values (or prop-
erties thereof) are released. The session identifier is included as an additional
attribute and allows the Web service to link the authentication/identification
to the HTTPS session initiated in the first step.
5 Prototype
This section discusses the three software components that are developed for the
prototype in more detail, namely the identity management component on the
trusted module and supporting software on both the smartphone and the server.
5.1 Trusted module application
Currently, one identity management system is integrated in the prototype. This
section first describes this system and subsequently elaborates on the trusted
module.
Identity management architecture For authentication and attribute asser-
tion, the prototype uses the architecture presented in [7]. It is a privacy-friendly,
user-centric federated identity management approach based on a trusted secure
element. Multiple identity providers can endorse the user’s personal information
to multiple service providers. The secure element acts as a mediator between
the two. More specifically, an identity provider can store personal attributes (or
properties thereof) in secure element of each owner. Information that is endorsed
by identity providers can then be disclosed to service providers. The secure ele-
ment controls access to identity information. Before the secure element releases
attributes, the service provider first needs to authenticate to the secure element
and prove that it is authorized to access certain personal attributes.
Trusted module Three types of trusted modules are commonly available on
smartphones, namely SIM cards, secure elements and smart micro SD cards.
Software components for these modules are typically developed using the Java
Card subset of the Java programming language. This facilitates portability of
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the the proof-of-concept from [8] to the mobile phone as this is also developed
using Java Cards.
Every smartphone is equipped with a SIM. A SIM card, however, is typically
issued by telecom operators and hence installing additional software requires
their permission. This hinders deployment of the architecture. The main differ-
ence between the two other trusted modules is that secure elements are embedded
in the phone and can, hence, not be easily removed. The secure micro SD card
needs to be inserted in the MicroSD slot of the phone. This enables integration in
the large majority of smartphones. Our prototype is developed using the Mobile
Security Card SE 1.0 Secure MicroSD of Giesecke & Devrient.
5.2 Smartphone application
To enable communication between the trusted module and service providers, a
mobile application is developed. This application uses the communication capa-
bilities of the mobile phone (e.g. Bluetooth, NFC, xG or camera) to interact with
these devices and forward the necessary communication to the trusted module.
In the setting of a Web application, xG is used to interact with remote servers.
The trusted element might require connections to identity providers to obtain
requested attributes (that are not cached on the tamperproof module). A com-
munication request is passed to the smartphone application which then initiates
connections to the required identity providers.
Apart from the data transfer, the mobile application also offers multiple man-
agement functions to the user. This management functionality is related to the
identity management architecture presented in [7]. For instance, the application
shows the user to which service provider the trusted module is authenticating
(i.e. by interpreting information obtained from the service provider certificate)
and which attributes are requested. If several optional attributes are requested,
the user can select whether or not to disclose those attributes. The application
also allows to specify policies that are enforced on the trusted element.
5.3 Server extension
The server extension allows service providers and identity providers to support
the authentication mechanism. Service providers can specify the attributes re-
quired for successful authentication. The extension handles the authentication
and makes the attributes available to the Web application.
The Web server authentication module was implemented for Apache Tom-
cat by writing an authentication valve. This valve behaves as a filter for the
Web application and can, hence, intercept and handle the requests related to
authentication and authorisation. The required server credentials are obtained
from a MySQL server. The module can be easily inserted in existing Tomcat
applications by updating some configuration files and adding a jar in the lib
folder of Tomcat.
The login page contains a QR code containing the session identifier and the
location of the authentication extension.
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The attribute provisioning offered by identity providers is implemented as
a Web service that retrieves the requested attributes from a MySQL server,
encrypts them with the session key and sends them back to the trusted module
on the smartphone.
6 Evaluation
6.1 Validation against attack models
This section validates the prototype against the attack models that have been
mentioned in section 3.
M1 The attacker acquires physical control of the mobile device. User
credentials are securely stored on a trusted module, which only activates
upon successful PIN authentication by the user. As a result, the attacker
will not learn anything about the credentials, their attributes or properties
thereof. Nor will he be able to use them. In addition, cards with a compro-
mised PIN can be revoked.
M2 The attacker has full control of the workstation, including the
browser. As credentials are neither stored on nor transferred to the work-
station, the attacker will never learn anything about them. In this respect,
our system has better security properties than some existing two-factor au-
thentication systems like Google’s, since authentication takes place entirely
out-of-band. Furthermore, the mobile application feedback empowers the
user to choose whether or not to connect to the given service provider. As
a result, the user is better protected against malware directing him to un-
wanted service providers.
M3 The attacker has control of the workstation, but not of the browser.
Besides the remarks in (2), the user is also protected against man-in-the-
middle attacks that would cause him to authenticate a forged session to the
same service provider.
M4 The attacker can eavesdrop on network traffic and/or modify mes-
sages. The remarks from (3) also apply here. In addition to that, the at-
tacker will not be able to read nor inconspicuously modify communication
traffic between the smartphone and the service provider. The same applies
to traffic going from the workstation to the service provider, assuming the
user properly communicates using HTTPS.
6.2 Comparison with other solutions
Existing solutions are, for instance, governmental eID cards. We further evaluate
the case of the German eID [1] as it is one of the most privacy-friendly designs.
It, however, requires certified card readers which decreases usability, as they are
not commonly available. This can pose a problem in some countries. Users might
also not always have the required privileges to install them. Moreover, most
governmental eID architectures require the user to install additional software on
Using a Smartphone to Access Personalized Web Services on a Workstation 7
the workstation. Other solutions such as [5] rely on a smartphone and transfer
a proxy credential to the browser on the workstation. The browser can then
use this credential to set up mutually authenticated HTTPS sessions with servers.
This has the advantage that no additional software needs to be installed on
Web servers. It, however, requires the user to install a software component to
transfer the proxy credential from the smartphone to the browser. Moreover,
since traditional X.509 certificates are used, the user’s actions can be linked.
Furthermore, the credentials are transfered to the workstation which implies that
significant trust is required in the workstation (i.e. those technologies are not
usable on untrusted workstations). An out-of-band authentication mechanism
is used in the solution proposed by this paper. This allows authentication and
provisioning of reliable attribute values without requiring additional software
on the workstation. Moreover, no credentials are transferred to the workstation.
Passwords are privacy-friendly and easy to use but offer low security and do not
allow users to release reliable attribute values.
A similar approach to our solution is presented in [4]. However, there are
two important differences. First, our solution allows the use of multiple identity
providers. Additionally, in [4] the user has to go through an unverifiable regis-
tration process for each service provider. This approach also implies long-term
storage of the user’s data by each service provider, which increases the chance
of information loss or theft.
This work ProKI Germ. eID Passwords [4]
Additional software on client No Yes Yes No No
Trusted workstation No Yes No Yes No
Privacy-friendly Yes No Yes Yes No
Personalized services Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Server modifications Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 1. Comparison of this work with literature.
7 Discussion
The current prototype focuses on authentication to Web based services via the
workstation. However, there exist several other scenarios in which a mobile device
can be used to access personalised services. For instance, users might need to
prove that they are old enough to buy alcoholic beverages at a vending machine.
Other scenarios include controlled access to buildings, loyalty discounts, etc.
In these scenarios, the smartphone application may use NFC or Bluetooth to
connect to the service provider. Apart from the communication layer, no other
modifications are required in the smartphone application.
The smartphone application may also incorporate several other authentica-
tion technologies, such as anonymous credentials [2]. This would allow the user
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to select the most feasible authentication technology. The application could also
maintain a global view of the user’s anonymity [6] and offer automatic decision
support when attribute values are requested.
Users might unintentionally release additional information. For instance,
Bluetooth users are uniquely identifiable. It would therefore be useful for the
user to be able to specify an anonymity level. Depending on the specified level,
the application can decide to disable certain communication technologies or use
anonymous networks [3] to achieve the required anonymity level. In anonymous
mode, the application may also deny authentication requests in which unique
information is requested.
8 Conclusion
This paper has presented a prototype application that includes server and client
side support to enable personalised access to Web services. Authentication is del-
egated from the workstation to the user’s smartphone. The solution focuses on
minimizing trust in the workstation while still allowing privacy-friendly person-
alized Web services. The proposed approach was compared to existing solutions
in literature and several interesting research tracks were proposed.
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